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Abstract
Efficiency and fairness are two desiderata in market design. Fairness requires ran-
domization in many environments. Observing the inadequacy of Top Trading Cycle
(TTC) to incorporate randomization, Yu and Zhang (2020) propose the class of Frac-
tional TTC mechanisms to solve random allocation problems efficiently and fairly. The
assumption of strict preferences in the paper restricts the application scope. This paper
extends Fractional TTC to the full preference domain in which agents can be indiffer-
ent between objects. Efficiency and fairness of Fractional TTC are preserved. As a
corollary, we obtain an extension of the probabilistic serial mechanism in the house
allocation model to the full preference domain. Our extension does not require any
knowledge beyond elementary computation.
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1 Introduction
Efficiency and fairness are two desiderata in market design. In many allocation problems,
fairness requires the use of randomization because of indivisibility of resources. Through
allocating probabilities, we restore symmetry between agents and get a measure of fair-
ness. Among the few successful matching mechanisms, Gale’s Top Trading Cycle (TTC;
Shapley and Scarf, 1974) is best known for being efficient to solve deterministic allocation
problems. By trading all efficiency-enhancing cycles, TTC excludes any further Pareto im-
provement over its assignment. However, TTC is no longer efficient when randomization
is incorporated into its procedure through randomizing endowments or randomly breaking
priority ties.1 To solve this problem, Yu and Zhang (2020) propose the class of Fractional
Top Trading Cycle mechanisms (FTTC). FTTC extends TTC to solve random allocation
problems efficiently and fairly. However, though the assumption of strict preferences in that
paper covers many applications, there are still many environments where the natural prefer-
ence domain is the full preference domain in which preferences can be weak.2 To maintain
efficiency, preference ties cannot be broken arbitrarily before running FTTC. This paper
extends FTTC to the full preference domain, and maintains its efficiency and fairness.
On the strict preference domain, we present FTTC in the fractional endowment exchange
(FEE) model, which is a direct extension of Shapley and Scarf’s housing market model. In
the model an agent may own fractions of multiple objects, and an object may be owned
by multiple agents. The idea of trading cycles in TTC cannot be directly extended to the
model. In FTTC agents report favorite objects step by step as in TTC. Our innovation is
to use linear equations to define how agents trade endowments at each step. The equations
satisfy a balanced trade condition, which requires that at each step the amount of favorite
object obtained by each agent be equal to the amount of endowments lost by the agent.
By connecting the equations to the closed Leontief input-outuput model (Leontief, 1941),
we prove that the solution to the equations exists. This ensures that FTTC is well-defined.
We add parameters to the equations to control fairness. The parameters determine how the
owners of each object divide the right of using the object to trade with the others.
A simple example can illustrate why preference ties cannot be arbitrarily broken. Let us
1For example, in the house allocation model, TTC with uniformly random endowments is equivalent
to the Random Priority mechanism (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 1998), which is not ex-ante efficient
(Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001).
2See Bogomolnaia et al. (2005); Erdil and Ergin (2017) for arguments for why the full preference domain
naturally appears in many environments.
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consider two agents i, j who own equal divisions of two objects a, b. Agent i is indifferent
between a and b, but j strictly prefers a to b. If after breaking ties we let i strictly prefer a to
b, then in the only individually rational assignment i, j will keep their endowments. But for
true preferences, the only individually rational and efficient assignment is the one in which
i obtains b and j obtains a.
Our idea to solve weak preferences is to utilize endowment exchange in FTTC. At any
step, if an object has been used up by all of its owners in the trading process, but some
agent who obtains an amount of the object finds that a remaining object is as good as the
former object, we let the agent label his consumption of the former object as an endowment
that is available for trading. In the following trading process, the balanced trade condition
ensures that when the agent loses an amount of the object from his consumption, he will be
compensated by obtaining an equal amount of indifferent objects. The agent will withdraw
the label when there no longer exists an indifferent available object. In the above example,
suppose at the first step i, j obtain their own endowments 1/2a through self-trading. After
that, a is exhausted, but i labels his consumption 1/2a as available for trading because there
remains an indifferent object b. At the second step, i demands b and j demands a. So i
will not only obtain his endowment 1/2b through self-trading, but also obtain 1/2b through
exchanging endowments with j. We obtain the unique desirable assignment in the example.
Of course, the example illustrates a simple case. In general cases, when an agent labels
his consumption of an object as available for trading, this may induce another agent to label
his consumption of another object as available for trading, and so on until a chain appears.
To maintain efficiency, it is crucial to find all such chains in the procedure of FTTC. So in
the definition of FTTC in this paper, we add a labeling stage at the beginning of each step
to find all such chains. Other than that, the definition remains almost same as on the strict
preference domain. We prove that FTTC remains to be individually rational and sd-efficient,
and the conditions imposed on the parameters in FTTC to ensure various fairness axioms
on the strict preference domain remain to work on the full preference domain.
The literature since Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) has studied random allocation inten-
sively in the house allocation model. The model implicitly assumes that agents collectively
own all objects, and no agent is favored over any other. So we regard the model as a special
case of FEE in which agents own equal divisions of all objects. On the strict preference
domain, we have shown that every FTTC conicides with a simultaneous eating algorithm
of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001), and a subclass of FTTC that treats all agents equally
coincides the Probabilistic Serial mechanism (PS). This means that our definition of FTTC
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in this paper subsumes an extension of PS to the full preference domain. The extension can
be described as an eating algorithm and maintains efficiency and fairness of PS. Its only de-
viation from PS is that when an agent labels his consumption of an object as available for the
others to consume and some others are indeed consuming his consumption, we instantly in-
crease his eating rate following the rule we call “you request my house - I get your rate”.3 This
rule is the degeneration of the balanced trade condition to eating algorithms. An extreme
case of weak preferences is the dichotomous preference domain.4 On such domain we show
that our extension of PS finds the egalitarian solution proposed by Bogomolnaia and Moulin
(2004). Katta and Sethuraman (2006) propose an algorithm to find the egalitarian solution
through solving a network flow problem. By iteratively applying the algorithm, they obtain
an extension of PS to the full preference domain. Comparing with their algorithm, ours does
not require any knowledge beyond elementary computation.
On the strict preference domain, we extend FTTC to school choice with coarse priorities.
At each step, among remaining students, only those of highest priority at each school can
use the seats of the school to trade with the others, and for fairness we let them use equal
fractions of the seats of the school to trade with the others. We can extend this mechanism to
the full preference domain as we did in the FEE model. We omit the details. We are different
from Erdil and Ergin (2017) who focus on stable matchings in two-sided matching with weak
preferences on both sides. Because FTTC reduces to TTC in the housing market model, our
definition of FTTC also subsumes an extension of TTC to the full preference domain. The
extension resembles Jaramillo and Manjunath (2012) and Alcalde-Unzu and Molis (2011),
and thus can preserve strategy-proofness of TTC if parameters in its definition are properly
chosen. We also omit the details.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the FEE model. Section
3 briefly revisits the definition of FTTC on the strict preference domain, and then presents
our definition of FTTC on the full preference domain. Section 4 shows that efficiency and
fairness of FTTC are preserved on the full preference domain. Section 5 applies FTTC to the
house allocation model. FTTC finds the egalitarian solution on the dichotomous preference
domain, and extends PS to the full preference domain.
3Yu and Zhang (2020) use this rate-adjusting rule to obtain an extension of PS to the house allocation
with existing tenants model.
4Each agent regards each object as either acceptable or unacceptable, and regards the objects in the same
class as indifferent.
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2 Fractional Endowment Exchange Model
A fractional endowment exchange (FEE) problem is a four-tuple (I, O,%I , ω) in which
• I is a finite set of agents;
• O is a finite set of objects;
• %I= {%i}i∈I is the preference profile of agents;
• ω = (ωi,o)i∈I,o∈O is the endowment matrix.
For each agent i, ωi = (ωi,o)o∈O denotes i’s endowments, with ωi,o ∈ [0, 1] being the amount
(probability share) of o ∈ O owned by i. Let qo =
∑
i∈I ωi,o denote the total amount of o ∈ O
in the market, which is an integer. Each agent demands one object and his total amount
of endowments is no more than one; that is,
∑
o∈O ωi,o ≤ 1.
5 Each agent has a preference
relation %i over objects. %i is complete and transitive, but needs not to be strict. Let ≻i and
∼i respectively denote the asymmetric and the symmetric components of %i. The housing
market problem is a special case of the FEE model if |I| = |O| and ω is a permutation
matrix. The house allocation problem can be regarded as a special case of the FEE model
if |O| = |I| and ωi,o = 1/|I| for all i ∈ I and all o ∈ O.
A lottery is a vector l ∈ ℜ
|O|
+ such that
∑
o∈O lo ≤ 1. A lottery l weakly (first-order)
stochastically dominates another lottery l′ for agent i, denoted by l %sdi l
′, if
∑
o′%io
lo′ ≥∑
o′%io
l′o′ for all o ∈ O. If the inequality is strict for some o, l strictly stochastically dominates
l′, denoted by l ≻sdi l
′. We denote by l ∼sdi l
′ if l %sdi l
′ and l′ %sdi l.
An assignment is a matrix p = (pi,o)i∈I,o∈O ∈ ℜ
|I|×|O|
+ such that
∑
i∈I pi,o ≤
∑
i∈I ωi,o for
all o ∈ O and
∑
o∈O pi,o ≤ 1 for all i ∈ I. Each pi,o is the amount of o assigned to i. The row
vector pi = (pi,o)o∈O is the lottery assigned to i. If all elements of p are integers, p is a deter-
ministic assignment. The Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem and its generalization (Birkhoff,
1946; Von Neumann, 1953; Kojima and Manea, 2010) guarantee that every assignment is a
convex combination of deterministic assignments. An assignment p is ex-post efficient if it
can be written as a convex combination of Pareto efficient deterministic assignments. An
assignment p strictly stochastically dominates another assignment p′, denoted by p ≻sdI p
′, if
pi %
sd
i p
′
i for all i and pj ≻
sd
j p
′
j for some j. An assignment p is sd-efficient if it is never
strictly stochastically dominated. It is individually rational (IR) if pi %
sd
i ωi for all i ∈ I. IR
implies that
∑
o∈O pi,o =
∑
o∈O ωi,o for all i ∈ I.
5If an agent has more endowments than his demand, when his demand is satisfied in our mechanisms, his
residual endowments can be inherited by the remaining agents. For simplicity we do not discuss inheritance.
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We define four fairness axioms. From the weakest to the strongest, they are equal treat-
ment of equals (ETE), equal-endowment no envy (EENE), bounded envy (BE), and envy-
freeness (EF). ETE and EENE require fairness among “equal” agents. BE is proposed by
Yu and Zhang (2020) to require fairness among any agents. It requires that if an agent is
envied by another agent, then the envy is bounded by the former agent’s advantage in en-
dowments. EF is the strongest axiom that eliminates envy between any two agents. It is
compatible with IR in special cases of the FEE model, but they are incompatible in general
cases.
Formally, an assignment p satisfies
• ETE if for all i, j ∈ I such that ωi = ωj and %i=%j , pi = pj;
• EENE if for all i, j ∈ I such that ωi = ωj, pi %
sd
i pj and pj %
sd
j pi;
• BE if for all i, j ∈ I, maxo∈O
[∑
o′%io
pj,o′ −
∑
o′%io
pi,o′
]
≤
∑
o∈O:ωj,o>ωi,o
(
ωj,o − ωi,o
)
;
• EF if for all i, j ∈ I, pi %
sd
i pj and pj %
sd
j pi.
We denote an FEE problem by its preference profile when the other elements are fixed.
Let R denote the set of all complete and transitive preference relations. A mechanism ϕ
finds an assignment ϕ(%I) for each %I∈ R
|I|. The lottery assigned to each i ∈ I in ϕ(%I)
is denoted by ϕi(%I). A mechanism satisfies an efficiency or fairness axiom if its found
assignments satisfy the axiom.
We say an agent i weakly manipulates a mechanism ϕ at %I by reporting %
′
i∈ R\{%i}
if ϕi(%I) 6%
sd
i ϕi(%
′
i,%−i). We say i strongly manipulates ϕ at %I by reporting %
′
i if ϕi(%
′
i
,%−i) ≻
sd
i ϕi(%I). ϕ is (weakly) strategy-proof if it is never (strongly) manipulated.
3 FTTC on the full preference domain
3.1 Strict preference domain
To understand our definition of FTTC on the full preference domain, we revisit the definition
on the strict preference domain. When preferences are strict, at each step of FTTC, each
remaining agent reports his unique favorite remaining object. A parameterized linear equa-
tion system describes how agents trade endowments at each step. By solving the equations,
we obtain the amount of favorite object each agent obtains and the amount of endowments
he loses. Parameters in the equations control fairness.
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We define some notations to describe the equations. These notations will also be used
in the next subsection. At the end of step d, let I(d) and O(d) denote the set of remaining
agents and the set of remaining objects respectively (I(0) = I and O(0) = O); let ω(d) =
(ωi,o(d))i∈I,o∈O denote the matrix of remaining endowments. At step d, each i ∈ I(d − 1)
reports his favorite object among O(d− 1), denoted by oi(d). At step d, let xi(d) denote the
amount of oi(d) assigned to i ∈ I(d − 1), and let xo(d) denote the amount of o ∈ O(d − 1)
assigned to all agents. So xo(d) is also the total amount of o lost by its owners from their
endowments at step d. We use a parameter λi,o(d) denote the proportion of xo(d) that is
lost by i from his endowments. That is, i loses λi,o(d)xo(d) of o at step d. We write all
such parameters into a matrix λ(d) =
(
λi,o(d)
)
i∈I(d−1),o∈O(d−1)
, and call it ratio matrix. The
matrix controls how the owners of each object divide the right of using the object to trade
with the others at step d. For all i ∈ I(d− 1) and all o ∈ O(d− 1),
∑
i∈I(d−1) λi,o(d) = 1 and
λi,o(d) > 0 only if ωi,o(d−1) > 0. We use another parameter βi,o(d) to control the maximum
amount of o ∈ O(d−1) that each i ∈ I(d−1) can lose at step d. So 0 ≤ βi,o(d) ≤ ωi,o(d−1).
We write them into another matrix β(d) =
(
βi,o(d)
)
i∈I(d−1),o∈O(d−1)
, and call it quota matrix.
At each step d, we solve the equations


xo(d) =
∑
i∈I(d−1):oi(d)=o
xi(d) for all o ∈ O(d− 1),
xi(d) =
∑
o∈O(d−1) λio(d)xo(d) for all i ∈ I(d− 1),
(1)
subject to the constraints
λi,o(d)xo(d) ≤ βi,o(d) for all i ∈ I(d− 1) and all o ∈ O(d− 1). (2)
The first equation of (1) is obtained by the definition of x, while the second equation of
(1) describes balanced trade among agents. Denote the maximum solution to (1) subject
to (2) by x∗(d). In Yu and Zhang (2020) we prove that, given λ(d) and β(d), because the
coefficient matrix of (1) is stochastic (i.e., its every column sums to one), the solution x∗(d)
at each step d exists. So FTTC is well-defined. The fact that agents obtain favorite objects
step by step and they trade endowments in a balanced way straightforwardly implies that
FTTC is IR and sd-efficient. When λ(d) is properly chosen (as presented in Section 4),
FTTC can satisfy any of ETE, EENE, and BF.
3.2 Full preference domain
With weak preferences, we can run FTTC after breaking preference ties. But as explained
in Introduction, any preference-independent tie-breaking rule can cause efficiency loss. Our
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method is to let agents label some of their consumptions as endowments available for trading
when they find other available indifferent objects. The balanced trade condition ensures that
when they lose an amount of consumptions, they will be compensated by obtaining an equal
amount of indifferent objects. We have briefly explain this method through a simple example
in Introduction. Below we use another example to explain it more clearly.
Example 1. Consider three agents {1, 2, 3} and three objects {a, b, c}. Agents have equal
endowments (1/3a, 1/3b, 1/3c) and the following preferences:
%1 %2 %3
{a, b} a a
b c
c c b
• Step one: Agent 1 points to a, b. Agents 2 and 3 point to a. Suppose agents obtain
equal amounts of favorite objects and lose equal amounts of endowments; in particular,
1 obtains equal amounts of a, b. So after this step, 1 obtains (1/5a, 1/5b), 2 and 3 each
obtain 2/5a, and each agent loses (1/3a, 1/15b). Object a is used up.
• Step two: Because 1 is indifferent between a and b, and b has not been used up, 1 labels
his consumption of a as an endowment available for trading. So 1 points to b and 2,3
point to a. Suppose 2,3 obtain equal amounts of a. Then each of 2,3 obtains 1/10a,
and 1 obtains 3/10b. Note that 1 loses his consumption 1/5a to obtain an additional
1/5b. His net consumption amount is 3/10− 1/5 = 1/10, which is equal to that of 2,3.
• Step three: Because 1’s consumption of a has been exhausted at step two, 1,2 point to
b and 3 points to c. Suppose agents obtain equal amounts of objects. Then 1,2 each
obtain 1/4b, and 3 obtains 1/4c.
• Step four: All agents point to c, and each obtains 1/4c.
The mechanism finds the following assignment, which is the unique IR, sd-efficient and
envy-free assignment in this example:
1 2 3
3/4b 1/2a 1/2a
1/4c 1/4b 1/2c
1/4c
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As mentioned in Introduction, after an agent labels his consumption of some object as
an endowment available for trading, it may induce a chain of the other agents also to label
their consumptions as endowments available for trading. Every chain will look like
im+1 → om → im → · · · → o1 → i1 → o0,
where o0 is an object that has been exhausted in the trading process, while the other objects
in the chain have been exhausted. For each k = 1, . . . , m, ik is indifferent between ok−1
and ok, and labels his consumption of ok as a new endowment. The last agent im+1 strictly
prefers om to all remaining endowments and most prefers om among all new endowments.
Finding such chains are crucial for maintaining sd-efficiency of FTTC.
FTTC on the full preference domain
Notations: O(d), ω(d), xi(d), and xo(d) are defined as in Section 3.1. Let p(d) = (pi,o(d))i∈I,o∈O
denote the assignment found by the end of step d.
Step d ≥ 1: Every step consists of three stages.
1. Labeling
• Round 1: If any i ∈ I is indifferent between any o ∈ O(d − 1) and any o′ ∈
O\O(d− 1) with pi,o′(d − 1) > 0, label o
′ as an endowment and let o′ point to i.
Denote the set of such i by L1(d−1). For each i ∈ L1(d−1), let O˜i(d−1) denote
the set of objects labeled by i. Let O˜1(d− 1) = ∪i∈L1(d−1)O˜i(d− 1).
• Round 2: If any i ∈ I\L1(d− 1) is indifferent between any o ∈ O˜1(d− 1) and any
o′ ∈ O\[O(d− 1)∪ O˜1(d− 1)] with pi,o′(d− 1) > 0, label o
′ as an endowment and
let o′ point to i. Denote the set of such i by L2(d− 1). For each i ∈ L2(d− 1), let
O˜i(d−1) denote the set of objects labeled by i. Let O˜2(d−1) = ∪i∈L2(d−1)O˜i(d−1).
...
• Round n: If any i ∈ I\ ∪n−1k=1 Lk(d− 1) is indifferent between any o ∈ O˜n−1(d− 1)
and any o′ ∈ O\[O(d−1)∪O˜1(d−1)∪· · ·∪O˜n−1(d−1)] with pi,o′(d−1) > 0, label
o′ as an endowment and let o′ point to i. Denote the set of such i by Ln(d− 1).
For each i ∈ Ln(d − 1), let O˜i(d − 1) denote the set of objects labeled by i. Let
O˜n(d− 1) = ∪i∈Ln(d−1)O˜i(d− 1).
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Since there are finite agents and finite objects, the above procedure must stop in finite
rounds.6 Suppose it stops in n rounds. Let L(d − 1) = ∪nk=1Lk(d − 1), O˜(d − 1) =
∪i∈L(d−1)O˜i(d − 1), and O(d − 1) = O(d − 1) ∪ O˜(d − 1). So O(d − 1) is the set of
objects that are available in the trading process at step d.
2. Pointing
Define I(d − 1) = L(d − 1) ∪ {i ∈ I :
∑
o∈O ωi,o(d − 1) > 0} to be the set of active
agents. These agents can join the trading process at step d.
• Round 1: For every i ∈ I(d − 1), if i’s favorite objects among O(d − 1) include
objects from O(d − 1), let i point to all of his favorite objects from O(d − 1).
Denote the set of such agents by P1(d).
• Round 2: For every i ∈ I(d − 1)\P1(d), if i’s favorite objects among O(d − 1)
include objects from O˜1(d − 1), let i point to all of his favorite objects from
O˜1(d− 1). Denote by the set of such agents by P2(d).
...
• Round m: For every i ∈ I(d−1)\[∪m−1k=1 Pk(d)], if i’s favorite objects among O(d−1)
include objects from O˜m−1(d − 1), let i point to all of his favorite objects from
O˜m−1(d− 1). Denote the set of such agents by Pm(d).
Since there are finite agents and finite objects, the above procedure must stop in finite
rounds. Suppose it stops in m rounds. Then it must be that m ≤ n + 1. For every
i ∈ I(d− 1), let Ai(d) denote the set of objects pointed by i.
3. Trading
We choose a ratio matrix λ(d) =
(
λi,o(d)
)
i∈I(d−1),o∈O(d−1)
and a quota matrix β(d) =(
βi,o(d)
)
i∈I(d−1),o∈O(d−1)
as we did on the strict preference domain. The only difference
is that now the ratio matrix includes parameters for O˜(d − 1). For all o ∈ O˜(d − 1),
we require that
∑
i∈I(d−1) λi,o(d) = 1 and λi,o(d) > 0 only if o ∈ O˜i(d− 1).
Because an agent may point to several objects, we introduce another nonnegative
matrix γ(d) =
(
γi,o(d)
)
i∈I(d−1),o∈O(d−1)
to control how each agent i divides his demand
among the objects in Ai(d). We call γ(d) division matrix and require that, for all
i ∈ I(d− 1),
∑
o∈O(d−1) γi,o(d) = 1 , and γi,o(d) > 0 only if o ∈ Ai(d).
6Every agent will appear in at most one round of the Labeling stage.
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Let x∗(d) = (x∗a(d))a∈I(d−1)∪O(d−1) be the maximum solution to the equation system:


xo(d) =
∑
i∈I(d−1):o∈Ai(d)
γi,o(d)xi(d) for all o ∈ O(d− 1),
xi(d) =
∑
o∈O(d−1) λi,o(d)xo(d) for all i ∈ I(d− 1),
(3)
subject to the constraints


λi,o(d)xo(d) ≤ βi,o(d) for all i ∈ I(d− 1) and all o ∈ O(d− 1),
λi,o(d)xo(d) ≤ pi,o(d− 1) for all i ∈ I(d− 1) and all o ∈ O˜(d− 1).
(4)
For all i ∈ I(d− 1) and all o ∈ O, let
ωi,o(d) =


ωi,o(d− 1)− λi,o(d)xo(d) if o ∈ O(d− 1),
0 otherwise,
and
pi,o(d) =


pi,o(d− 1)− λi,o(d)xo(d) if o ∈ O˜i(d),
pi,o(d− 1) + γi,o(d)xi(d) if o ∈ Ai(d),
pi,o(d− 1) otherwise.
For all i ∈ I\I(d− 1), ωi(d) = ωi(d− 1) and pi(d) = pi(d− 1).
Let O(d) = {o ∈ O(d − 1) :
∑
i∈I ωi,o(d) > 0}. If O(d) is empty, stop the algorithm.
Otherwise, go to step d+ 1.
Because the coefficient matrix of the equation system (3) is still stochastic, the maximum
solution x∗(d) at each step exists. By choosing different parameter values, we obtain different
FTTC mechanisms on the full preference domain.
To facilitate our discussion in remaining sections, define
xci (d) =
∑
o∈O˜(d−1)
λi,o(d)xo(d),
xni (d) =
∑
o∈O(d−1)
λi,o(d)xo(d).
In words, xci(d) denotes the amount of consumptions that i loses at step d, and x
n
i (d) denotes
the amount of i’s net consumption at step d. So xi(d) = x
c
i(d) + x
n
i (d). By losing x
c
i(d) of
consumptions, i obtains an equal amount xci(d) of indifferent objects. What matters for i’s
welfare is the net consumption xni (d).
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4 Efficiency and Fairness
We show that IR, efficiency and fairness of FTTC on the strict preference domain remain to
hold on the full preference domain.
Recall that at each step d, O(d− 1) = O(d− 1) ∪ O˜(d− 1) is the set of objects available
for trading. We prove a lemma stating that O(d − 1) weakly shrinks in the procedure of
FTTC. It means that once an object becomes unavailable for trading at some step, it remains
unavailable at following steps. This feature is crucial for maintaining desirable properties of
FTTC on the full preference domain.
Lemma 1. For any step d ≥ 1, O(d) ⊆ O(d− 1).
Proof. By definition, O(d) ⊆ O(d − 1) ⊆ O(d − 1). So we only need to prove that O˜(d) ⊆
O(d−1). We enumerate the objects in O˜(d) to prove this result. Define E(d) = O(d−1)\O(d)
to be the set of objects that are exhausted in the trading process at step d. In the labeling
stage of step d+ 1, we know that there exists n ∈ N such that O˜(d) = ∪nk=1O˜k(d).
Base step. For every o′ ∈ O˜1(d), if o
′ ∈ E(d), then o′ ∈ O(d − 1) ⊆ O(d − 1). If
o′ /∈ E(d), then o′ /∈ O(d − 1). So o′ is exhausted before step d. The fact that o′ ∈ O˜1(d)
means that some agent i is indifferent between o′ and a distinct object o ∈ O(d). Since
o ∈ O(d) ⊆ O(d− 1), i’s consumption of o′ must be labeled as available for trading at step
d. So o′ ∈ O(d− 1). Thus, O˜1(d) ⊆ O(d− 1).
Inductive step. Suppose for all ℓ = 1, . . . , k−1, O˜ℓ(d) ⊆ O(d−1). For every o
′ ∈ O˜k(d), if
o′ ∈ E(d), then o′ ∈ O(d−1) ⊆ O(d−1). If o′ /∈ E(d), then o′ /∈ O(d−1). So o′ is exhausted
before step d. The fact that o′ ∈ O˜k(d) means that some agent i is indifferent between o
′
and a distinct object o ∈ O˜k−1(d). Since o ∈ O˜k−1(d) ⊆ O(d− 1), i’s consumption of o
′ must
be labeled as available for trading at step d. So o′ ∈ O(d− 1). Thus, O˜k(d) ⊆ O(d− 1).
By induction, for all 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n, O˜ℓ(d) ⊆ O(d− 1). So O˜(d) ⊆ O(d− 1).
We prove that FTTC remains to be IR and sd-efficient.
Proposition 1. FTTC on the full preference domain is individually rational and sd-efficient.
Proof. (IR) At every step d, i’s net consumption stochastically dominates the endowments
he loses. So IR is obvious.
(Sd-efficiency) Suppose for some preference profile, the assignment found by some FTTC
is not sd-efficient. Then there must exist k ≥ 2 agents who need not be distinct, denoted by
i1, i2, . . . , ik, and k objects in the lotteries they obtain, denoted by o1, o2, . . . , ok, such that
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if the k agents trade an amount of the k objects in their consumptions as indicated by the
following cycle, none of them becomes worse off and some becomes strictly better off:
i1 → o2 → i2 → o3 → i3 → · · · → ok → ik → o1 → i1.
By trading the cycle, i1 obtains an amount of o2, i2 obtains an amount of o3, and so on.
Without loss of generality, assume that i1 is strictly better off. This means that i1 strictly
prefers o2 to o1. Suppose in the FTTC procedure, i1 starts consuming o1 at step d. Then
it must be that o1 ∈ O(d− 1) and o2 /∈ O(d− 1). Consider agent i2. Assume that i2 starts
consuming o2 at step d
′. There are two cases:
• If i2 strictly prefers o3 to o2, then it must be that o2 ∈ O(d
′ − 1) and o3 /∈ O(d
′ − 1).
Since o2 /∈ O(d− 1), by Lemma 1, it must be that d
′ < d, and so o3 /∈ O(d− 1).
• If i2 is indifferent between o3 and o2, since o2 /∈ O(d−1), it must be that o3 /∈ O(d−1);
otherwise, given o3 ∈ O(d− 1), i should label his consumption of o2 as available.
So in any case we get o3 /∈ O(d−1). By applying the above arguments inductively to the
remaining agents and objects in the cycle, we get o1 /∈ O(d−1), which is a contradiction.
Yu and Zhang (2020) present conditions on λ(d) to satisfy various fairness axioms. We
show that they still ensure fairness on the full preference domain.
Definition 1. An FTTC satisfies
(1) stepwise equal treatment of equals (stepwise ETE) if at every step d,
ωi(d− 1) = ωj(d− 1), O˜i(d− 1) = O˜j(d− 1) and Ai(d) = Aj(d) =⇒ λi(d) = λj(d).
(2) stepwise equal-endowment equal treatment (stepwise EEET) if at every step d,
ωi(d− 1) = ωj(d− 1) =⇒ λi,o(d) = λj,o(d) for all o ∈ O(d− 1).
(3) bounded advantage if at every step d,
ωi,o(d− 1) ≥ ωj,o(d− 1) =⇒ λi,o(d) ≥ λj,o(d) and ωi,o(d) ≥ ωj,o(d).
Proposition 2. (1) An FTTC satisfying stepwise ETE satisfies ETE;
(2) An FTTC satisfying stepwise EEET satisfies EENE;
(3) An FTTC satisfying bounded advantage satisfies BE.
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Proof. (1) For any two agents i, j with ωi = ωj and %i=%j , stepwise ETE implies that at
every step, i and j label the same set of consumptions as available, point to the same set of
favorite objects, and obtain equal consumptions. So ETE is satisfied.
(2) For any two agents i, j, at any step d, if ωi(d − 1) = ωj(d − 1), by stepwise EEET,
λi,o(d) = λj,o(d) for all o ∈ O(d − 1). It implies that ωi(d) = ωj(d) and x
n
i (d) = x
n
j (d). So
i, j have equal amounts of net consumptions at step d and their remaining endowments are
still equal after step d. Now if i, j have equal endowments (i.e., ωi = ωj), then i, j must have
equal amounts of net consumptions throughout the procedure of FTTC. Because at every
step i, j point to their respective favorite objects, in the found assignment there must be no
envy between them.
(3) Let p denote the assignment found by any FTTC satisfying bounded advantage. For
any distinct i, j ∈ I, let o∗ be the solution to maxo∈O
[∑
o′%io
pj,o′ −
∑
o′%io
pi,o′
]
. Let d be
the earliest step after which all objects in {o ∈ O : o %i o
∗} become unavailable. That
is, {o ∈ O : o %i o
∗} ∩ O(d) = ∅ and {o ∈ O : o %i o
∗} ∩ O(d − 1) 6= ∅. By Lemma 1,
{o ∈ O : o %i o
∗} ∩ O(d′) = ∅ for all d′ ≥ d. So,
∑
o%io∗
pi,o =
d∑
d′=1
xni (d
′) =
∑
o∈O
(
ωi,o − ωi,o(d)
)
,
∑
o%io∗
pj,o ≤
d∑
d′=1
xnj (d
′) =
∑
o∈O
(
ωj,o − ωj,o(d)
)
.
For all o ∈ O such that ωi,o ≥ ωj,o, bounded advantage implies that for all 1 ≤ d
′ ≤ d,
ωi,o(d
′) ≥ ωj,o(d
′) and λi,o(d
′) ≥ λj,o(d
′). So,
ωj,o − ωj,o(d) =
d∑
d′=1
λj,o(d
′)xo(d
′) ≤
d∑
d′=1
λi,o(d
′)xo(d
′) = ωi,o − ωi,o(d),
or equivalently, (
ωj,o − ωj,o(d)
)
−
(
ωi,o − ωi,o(d)
)
≤ 0.
For all o ∈ O such that ωi,o < ωj,o, bounded advantage implies that for all 1 ≤ d
′ ≤ d,
ωi,o(d
′) ≤ ωj,o(d
′) and λi,o(d
′) ≤ λj,o(d
′). In particular, ωi,o(d) ≤ ωj,o(d). So,
(
ωj,o − ωj,o(d)
)
−
(
ωi,o − ωi,o(d)
)
≤ ωj,o − ωi,o.
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Therefore,
∑
o%io∗
pj,o −
∑
o%io∗
pi,o ≤
∑
o∈O
[(
ωj,o − ωj,o(d)
)
−
(
ωi,o − ωi,o(d)
)]
=
∑
o∈O:ωi,o≥ωj,o
[(
ωj,o − ωj,o(d)
)
−
(
ωi,o − ωi,o(d)
)]
+
∑
o∈O:ωi,o<ωj,o
[(
ωj,o − ωj,o(d)
)
−
(
ωi,o − ωi,o(d)
)]
≤
∑
o∈O:ωi,o<ωj,o
(
ωj,o − ωi,o
)
.
So p satisfies BE.
As examples, Yu and Zhang (2020) present three fair FTTC and connect their fairness
motivations to classical solution rules in the bankruptcy problem. All of the three FTTC
satisfy bounded advantage, and thus BE. One of them is called equal-FTTC and denoted by
T e. Its idea is to let the remaining owners of each object at each step use equal amounts of
the object to trade with the others. Formally, it uses the following parameters:
λei,o(d) =


1
|j ∈ I(d− 1) : ωj,o(d− 1) > 0|
if ωi,o(d− 1) > 0,
0 if ωi,o(d− 1) = 0,
βei,o(d) = ωi,o(d− 1).
Another is called proportional-FTTC and denoted by T p. Its idea is to let the remaining
owners of each object at each step use amounts proportional to their endowments of the
object to trade with the others. Formally, it uses the following parameters:
λpi,o(d) =
ωi,o(d− 1)∑
j∈I(d−1) ωj,o(d− 1)
,
βpi,o(d) = ωi,o(d− 1).
The third FTTC, omitted here, can be found in our other paper.7 To extend them to
the full preference domain, we can choose the parameters λ(d) =
(
λi,o(d)
)
i∈I(d−1),o∈O˜(d−1)
and γ(d) arbitrarily. The extensions will still satisfy bounded advantage. Because of their
intuitive fairness, they are appealing candidates in applications when market designers want
to choose an FTTC.
7At each step of the third FTTC, among the remaining owners of each object only those who own the
most amount of object can use the object to trade with the others, and the amount they can use is no more
than the difference between the most amount and the second most amount.
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5 House allocation
In the house allocation model, a number of objects O are to be assigned to an equal num-
ber of agents I. In Yu and Zhang (2020) we regard the model as a special case of FEE in
which agents own equal divisions of all objects. We have explained that, on the strict prefer-
ence domain, every FTTC coincides with a simultaneous eating algorithm (SEA) defined by
Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001), and every FTTC satisfying stepwise EEET coincides with
PS. This means that in the house allocation model, every FTTC satisfying stepwise EEET
defined in this paper (e.g., T e and T p) is an extension of PS to the full preference domain.
Because agents have equal endowments, such FTTC satisfies envy-freeness.
Proposition 3. In the house allocation model, every FTTC satisfying stepwise EEET is an
extension of PS to the full preference domain. The extension is sd-efficient and envy-free.
Actually, every FTTC satisfying stepwise EEET can be described as an SEA that deviates
from PS in two respects. First, agents label their consumptions as available for others to
consume when they find indifferent available objects in the market. Second, when an agent’s
labeled consumption is being consumed by the others, his eating rate is instantly increased,
following the rule we call “you request my house - I get your rate”. Formally, at any time
t ∈ [0, 1], any agent i’s eating rate is defined to be
si(t) = 1 +
∑
o∈O˜i(t)
[
λi,o(t)
∑
j∈I:o∈Aj(t)
γj,o(t)sj(t)
]
.
In words, i’s eating rate is increased by an amount that is equal to the total rate at which
his labeled consumptions are being consumed by the others.
The dichotomous preference domain is an extreme case of weak preferences. On such
domain, all Pareto efficient deterministic assignments assign the same number of objects
to agents, and sd-efficiency coincides with ex-post efficiency for random assignments. Each
agent’s welfare in an assignment is simply measured by the amount of acceptable objects he
obtains. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004) propose an efficient and fair welfare distribution
called egalitarian solution. Its idea is to maximize agents’ total welfare and at the same
time equalize their welfare as much as possible. Katta and Sethuraman (2006) show that
the egalitarian solution can be found by an algorithm that computes a lexicographically
optimal flow in a network. By iteratively applying the algorithm, Katta and Sethuraman
propose an extension of PS to the full preference domain. In the next subsection we prove
that any FTTC satisfying stepwise EEET finds the egalitarian solution on the dichotomous
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preference domain. This clarifies the relation between our extension of PS with Katta and
Sethuraman’s. The merit of our extension is that it remains to have an SEA description,
and it does not require any knowledge beyond elementary computation.
5.1 Dichotomous preferences
For every i ∈ I, let Ci denote the set of i’s acceptable objects. For every nonempty Y ⊆ I
and nonempty O′ ⊂ O, define
Γ(Y,O′) =
(
∪i∈Y Ci
)
∩O′
to be the set of objects from O′ that are acceptable to at least one agent in Y . Given
any economy, the Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition Lemma (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2004)
states that it can be decomposed into three subproblems. In the first subproblem there is a
perfect match between objects and agents so that each agent obtains an acceptable object.
In the second subproblem there are oversupply of acceptable objects for any subset of agents,
so every agent can also obtain an acceptable object. But in the third subproblem there is
shortage of acceptable objects.8 BM’s egalitarian solution is proposed to solve the third
subproblem. So we restrict attention to economies belonging to the third type. We assume
that every object is acceptable to at least one agent (that is, Γ(I, O) = O), and for every
nonempty O′ ⊂ O, |{i ∈ I : Ci ∩ O
′ 6= ∅}| > |O′|.
The egalitarian solution is defined through finding a sequence of bottleneck sets of agents.
The first bottleneck set is defined to be
X∗1 = argmin
Y⊆I
|Γ(Y,O)|
|Y |
. (5)
When there are multiple solutions to the above problem, let X∗1 be the solution of largest
cardinality.9 Γ(X∗1 , O) are assigned to X
∗
1 fairly such that each i ∈ X
∗
1 obtains
|Γ(X∗
1
,O)|
|X∗
1
|
of
acceptable objects.
The second bottleneck set is found in the same way as (5) among the remaining agents
Z1 = I\X
∗
1 and remaining objects P1 = O\Γ(X
∗
1 , O). In general, the k-th bottleneck set is
defined to be
X∗k = arg min
Y⊆Zk−1
|Γ(Y, Pk−1)|
|Y |
.
8When both sides are agents as in the model of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004), the second and the third
subproblems are symmetric.
9The union of two solutions is still a solution. So X∗
1
is unique.
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When there are multiple solutions, let X∗k be the solution of largest cardinality. In the egal-
itarian solution, every i ∈ X∗k obtains
|Γ(X∗k ,Pk−1)|
|X∗
1
|
of acceptable objects. Let X∗1 , X
∗
2 , . . . , X
∗
m
be the sequence of bottleneck sets.
We prove that the above sequence of bottleneck sets is implicitly found in the procedure
of any FTTC satisfying EEET. Recall that O(d) = O(d − 1) ∪ O˜(d) and O(0) = O. By
Lemma 1, O(d) ⊂ O(d − 1) for every step d. Let d1, d2, . . . , dn be the sequence of steps in
the procedure of FTTC such that, for all k = 1, . . . , n,
O(dk − 1)\O(dk) 6= ∅.
That is, d1 is the first step after which some objects (i.e., O\O(d1)) become unavailable for
trading at following steps. The other steps are interpreted similarly. dn is the last step after
which all objects are unavailable. We prove that each O(dk − 1)\O(dk) is a bottleneck set
defined by Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004).
Lemma 2. m = n, and for all k = 1, . . . , n
O(dk − 1)\O(dk) = Γ(X
∗
k , P
∗
k−1),
where P ∗0 = O and P
∗
k = P
∗
k−1\Γ(X
∗
k , P
∗
k−1) = O(dk).
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction.
Base case. We first prove that O(d1−1)\O(d1) = Γ(X
∗
1 , O). Let p denote the assignment
found by any FTTC satisfying EEET, and p(d) denote the assignment found by the end of
step d. Define X1 = {i ∈ I : pi,o(d) > 0 for some o ∈ O(d1 − 1)\O(d1)}. Because all objects
in O(d1−1)\O(d1) are assigned to agents at the end of step d and they are no longer available
after step d, it must be that O(d1 − 1)\O(d1) ⊂ Γ(X1, O). Suppose there exist i ∈ X1 and
o ∈ Ci such that o /∈ O(d1−1)\O(d1). Then, o ∈ O(d1). But it implies that i should label his
consumption of the objects in O(d1 − 1)\O(d1) as available at the beginning of step d1 + 1,
which is a contradiction. So,
O(d1 − 1)\O(d1) = Γ(X1, O).
Define
t1 =
|Γ(X1, O)|
|X1|
.
Because no objects become unavailable before step d1, no agent changes the objects he
points to before step d1. Then stepwise EEET implies that agents obtain equal amounts of
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net consumptions at every step. So at the end of step d1, every agent must obtain a total
amount t1 of acceptable objects.
For any nonempty Y ⊂ X1, Γ(Y,O) ⊆ Γ(X1, O) = O(d1 − 1)\O(d1). So,
|Γ(Y,O)|
|Y |
= t1.
For any nonempty Y ⊂ I such that Y \X1 6= ∅, it must be that for every j ∈ Y \X1,
Cj ∩ O(d1) 6= ∅, since otherwise j ∈ X1. Because every i ∈ Y obtains an amount t of
acceptable objects at the end of step d1 and every j ∈ Y \X1 has acceptable objects that are
still available after step d1, it must be that
|Γ(Y,O)|
|Y |
> t1.
So
X1 = argmin
Y⊂I
|Γ(Y,O)|
|Y |
,
and X1 is the solution of largest cardinality. It means that X1 = X
∗
1 .
Induction step. Suppose for all k = 2, . . . , ℓ (ℓ ≤ n− 1), O(dk − 1)\O(dk) = Γ(X
∗
k , P
∗
k−1).
We prove that O(dℓ+1 − 1)\O(dℓ+1) = Γ(X
∗
ℓ+1, P
∗
ℓ ) where P
∗
ℓ = O(dℓ) = O(dℓ+1− 1). Define
Zℓ = I\(∪
ℓ
k=1X
∗
k), and Xℓ+1 = {i ∈ I : pi,o(dℓ+1) > 0 for some o ∈ O(dℓ+1 − 1)\O(dℓ+1)}.
Because all objects in O\O(dℓ+1 − 1) are assigned to the agents in ∪
ℓ
k=1X
∗
k , it must be that
Xℓ+1 ⊂ Zℓ and O(dℓ+1 − 1)\O(dℓ+1) ⊂ Γ(Xℓ+1, O(dℓ+1 − 1)).
Suppose there exist i ∈ Xℓ+1 and o ∈ Ci such that o ∈ O(dℓ+1). Then it implies that
i should label his consumption of the objects in O(dℓ+1 − 1)\O(dℓ+1) as available at the
beginning of step dℓ+1 + 1, which is a contradiction. So
O(dℓ+1 − 1)\O(dℓ+1) = Γ(Xℓ+1, O(dℓ+1 − 1)).1
Then we can use similar arguments as in the base case to prove that
Xℓ+1 = arg min
Y⊂Zℓ
|Γ(Y,O(dℓ+1 − 1))|
|Y |
,
and Xℓ+1 is the solution of largest cardinality. It means that Xℓ+1 = X
∗
ℓ+1.
With Lemma 2, the following proposition is immediate.
Proposition 4. On the dichotomous preference domain, any FTTC satisfying stepwise
EEET finds the egalitarian solution of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004).
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Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004) have proved that any mechanism finding the egalitarian
solution is strategy-proof on the dichotomous preference domain.10
Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) shows the sd-inefficiency of the Random Priority mech-
anism (RP). On the dichotomous preference domain, RP will proceed as follows. It first
generates an ordering of agents uniformly at random, and then lets agents in the ordering
sequentially choose favorite assignments. Every agent chooses a set of favorite assignments
from those being chosen by previous agents. Because sd-efficiency coincides with ex-post
efficiency, RP becomes desirable: It is sd-efficient and strategy-proof, and seems to fair be-
cause the ordering of agents is uniformly random. However, noting that this randomization
is preference-independent, when it interacts with preferences through letting agents picking
objects (assignments), the fairness of the final assignment becomes not transparent. This is
also true for TTC with randomized endowments or randomized priorities. Example 2 shows
that RP does not find the egalitarian solution on the dichotomous preference domain.
Example 2. Consider five agents {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and three objects {o1, o2, o3}. Agents’ di-
chotomous preferences are shown by letting every agent point to all of his acceptable objects
in the following graph.
o1 o2 o3
1 2 3 4 5
Any FTTC satisfying stepwise EEET finds an egalitarian assignment:
1 2 3 4 5
1/2o1 1/2o1 2/3o2 1/3o2 2/3o3
1/3o3
But RP finds the following assignment:
1 2 3 4 5
9/20o1 9/20o1 1/10o1 4/10o2 7/10o3
6/10o2 3/10o3
Comparing with the RP assignment, the egalitarian assignment equalizes agents’ welfare as
much as possible.
10Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2004) prove that any such mechanism is group strategy-proof, meaning that
no group of agents can jointly manipulate the mechanism.
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